The Unbuilt Lancaster in America: Reasons Behind America's Preference for Other Bombers
Throughout World War II, the United States designed and built several long-range bombers, including the B17, B24, B29, and B32. One might wonder why these remarkably efficient aircraft were preferred over the Lancaster, a British long-range bomber with vast carrying capacity. This article explores the reasons behind the United States' choice to develop and prioritize other bomber programs, detailing the production capacity, missions, and engines that influenced this decision.
Production and Capacities
The B17, B24, and B29 bombers were already in production during the earlier stages of World War II. The B17 Flying Fortress, for instance, had a bomb capacity of 6,000 lbs for a range of 2,000 miles. The B24 Liberator, with a slightly lower payload, could carry 5,000 lbs for 2,100 miles. The B29 Superfortress, the longest-ranged bomber of its time, had a capacity of 20,000 lbs for a range of 2,800 miles. In contrast, the Lancaster, which entered service in early 1942, could carry 14,000 lbs for 2,200 miles.
USAAF Bomber Policy
The US Army Air Forces (USAAF) preferred daylight bombing missions, focusing on the B17 and B24 for these operations. At the time, the development of the B29 began in late 1939, and the XB-29 initial flight took place on September 21, 1942. Plans for a newer, even more capable aircraft, the B36, were also underway. The Lancaster, with its shorter range, less standard bomb load, and slower speed, would not have met the USAAF's requirements effectively.
Engine Considerations
Considering engines, the R-3350 engine, developed in the early 1930s and first flown in April 1941, was already available. The Packard-Merlin V-1650 was underpowered for the B-29, with its first production unit not being ready until 1941. On the other hand, all five bidders proposed the R-3350 for the engine specifications for a bomber capable of reaching Japan. The R-3350 production line provided a reliable power source for the bomber fleet, and diverting resources to the Lancaster would have been a costly and technologically demanding endeavor.
Conclusion
The choice to prioritize the development of the B17, B24, B29, and B36 over the Lancaster was not just about technical specifications but also about strategic bombing campaigns and production needs. The USAAF focused on bombers that could undertake daylight missions, longer ranges, and larger payloads. While the Lancaster excelled in certain aspects, the USAAF’s bomber strategy dictated the development of other aircraft types that better suited their operational requirements.